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Book Review: Rwanda and The Moral Obligation of
Humanitarian Intervention
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide that took the lives of approximately 800,000 men, women and
children is etched into our memories as one of the most acute failures of intervening in human
rights violations. In Rwanda and The Moral Obligation of Humanitarian
intervention, Joshua James Kassner contends that the international community had a moral
obligation to intervene and therefore unrolls a convincing argument for a significant reform of
the normative framework governing international relations. This argument bears
unquestionable urgency but regrettably fails to move beyond the oft-debated Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) framework. Reviewed by Lucas Van Milders.
Rwanda and The Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention. Joshua James Kassner. Edinburgh
University Press. November 2012.
Find this book: 
Joshua James Kassner’s assessment of  our moral obligation to act whenever human rights are
violated on a massive scale, such as during the Rwandan Genocide, situates itself  f irmly within a tradit ion
of  scholarly work that crit ically engages the prevailing norms of  our international system. This is
immediately apparent f rom the tit le, which ref ers to one of  the most controversial and dazzling challenges
of  International Relations af ter the Cold War on the one hand, and an example of  what is generally agreed
upon as one of  its disastrous and devastating consequences on the other.
Although invoking the memory of  one of  the most severe tragedies of  the second half  of  the 20th century
might seem a self -evident argument in f avour of  a more progressive def ence of  humanitarian intervention,
Kassner ’s engagement with Rwanda is reduced to such an extent that its inclusion in the tit le might be
called into question. A more f itt ing subtit le could theref ore be: Why did the international community f ail to
act? According to Kassner, there are conditions that induce an “all- things-considered reason f or action” (p.
11). These entail a violation of  the basic right to physical security, a guarantee that states do not need to
make internal sacrif ices, the protection of  a community of  moral signif icance, that international peace and
security will not be compromised unjustif iably, that those bearing the obligation are capable of  ef f ectively
f ulf illing this obligation, that intervention will not worsen the situation, and that intervention will not
undermine the presumption against non- intervention (p. 83). When these conditions are met, as was the
case in 1994 Rwanda, there is an irref utable obligation to act.
Underneath this argument runs a clearly articulated crit ique of  the value we put on state sovereignty.
Conservatively clinging to the importance of  sovereignty seems to be outdated since it is one of  the key
arguments in f avour of  an absolute norm of  non- intervention. Kassner has by no means the intention to
expel this norm out of  hand, since this would open the door f or an international system where
interventions (such as the American- led invasion of  Iraq in 2003) would become prevailing policies
conducted by those states that hold power. A middle ground between these two extremes would theref ore
be a rebuttable presumption (rather than the norm) of  non- intervention, according to Kassner. Non-
intervention would at all t imes be the f avourable option. Yet in the context of  all- things-considered reason
f or action, this presumption would have to be rebutted. This can only be done by placing less normative
weight on the importance of  state sovereignty, which in turn can only be achieved through the
implementation of  a new normative f ramework of  International Polit ics. Eventually, this leads Kassner to put
f orth such an amended f ramework, which includes a rebuttable presumption of  non- intervention. This rule
would enable the guidance of  the behaviour of  states but nonetheless be capable of  answering the
demand of  morality in the international arena (p. 124).
This theoretical narrative takes up the majority of  the book (chapter 1-3) and eventually opens into a
transit ion to practice by engaging the R2P f ramework. This might not come as a surprise since there is an
unquestionable resonance of  Kassner ’s constitutive conditions f or humanitarian intervention with the R2P
f ramework’s reliance on Just War Theory. In order to move beyond a merely dif f erent articulation of  the
same f ramework, Kassner exposes the heavy reliance of  the R2P f ramework on the inef f ective Security
Council as one of  its crucial shortcomings. Ref erring to Rwanda’s seat in the Security Council as a rotating
member in 1994 as one of  the major causes of  inaction, Kassner proposes a dif f erent approach that puts
more emphasis on subsidiarity as a key principle to guiding the actions conducted by (sub)regional polit ical
bodies like the Af rican Union and other security institution like NATO.
The problem with this reasoning is that Kassner places himself  on the def ence with regards to explaining
the inclusion of  the f irst three chapters, which cannot help but bring the R2P f ramework to mind. Leaving
out the theoretical section in f avour of  a more elaborate assessment of  a revised normative f ramework
would not only have prevented this predicament, it would have also avoided the f ailure of  not of f ering a
more insightf ul perspective on the moral obligation to intervene in the case of  human suf f ering than the
f lawed R2P f ramework. A more f undamental way out of  this predicament might be to ponder the question
whether it is not the f lawed f ramework but rather the enterprise of  constructing a context- independent
f ramework itself  that inhibits any prosperous outcome. Although Kassner ’s inclusion of  (sub)regional
polit ical bodies might be an essential element of  such an approach, the question whether this f ramework
can be applied on other examples of  humanitarian intervention is yet to be answered.
In short, Rwanda and the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention can be embedded in a strand of
literature that was triggered by the Rwandan genocide and in turn culminated in the R2P f ramework that
sought to prevent such tragedies in the f uture by ref orming the international system. Written nearly two
decades later, Kassner ’s legit imate attempt to rearticulate the necessity of  this ref orm while being aware of
the shortcomings of  the R2P f ramework unf ortunately does not seem to move beyond it.
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